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Abstract
In Switzerland, nursing home services are mainly provided by regulated
public and private nonprot organizations. Some of them are created by local
governments as foundations. This provides a unique setting to analyze the
impact of the institutional form on the performance of nursing homes. We
propose a model where the institutional form is represented as a legal con-
straint which a¤ects managers in the decison-making process. Considering
a sample of 44 Swiss Italian nursing homes over a 7-years period (1999-
2005), we then disentangle persistent ine¢ ciency due to di¤erences in the
institutional form from unobserved heterogeneity. The applied estimation
strategy provides more accurate estimates of the impact of the institutional
form on nursing homes e¢ ciency, as compared to previous studies. Our re-
sults suggest that governmental nursing homes are more costly than private
and public foundations. These results are consistent across di¤erent model
specications.
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1 Introduction
The inuence of di¤erent organizational structures on nursing homes (NHs) e¢ -
ciency is a relevant issue in most health care systems. The organizational structure
a¤ects the behavior of managers and, consequently, the governance of NHs. As
population ages and pressure on healthcare costs increases, some organizational
structures may be more successful in saving costs as compared to other structures.
In Switzerland, NHs services are mostly provided by regulated public and
private nonprot rms. For-prot institutions serve about 5% of the elderly pop-
ulation and generally provide luxury residential services. Around 46% of regulated
NHs are privately owned foundations, whereas 44% are governmental organiza-
tions. The latter do not have a separate juridical status and are directly integrated
in the local public administration. The remaining 10% of NHs is represented by
publicly-owned rms that have been created by local governments as foundations,
and are therefore called municipality-owned foundations. The provision of nursing
care services is organized at local level, andNHs operate as local monopolies and
face an excess of demand due to subsidized prices.
We distinguish between nonprot NHs subject to private-law working con-
tracts and NHs under public-law working contracts. Hereafter, we refer to those
two forms of institutions as private-law NHs and public-law NHs, respectively.
Public-law NHs correspond to governmental NHs, while private-law NHs include
privately-owned foundations as well as municipality-owned foundations. In public-
law NHs, the governing body is represented by local politicians (city council),
while the executive arm is left to the municipality, which delegates it to a man-
ager. In private-law NHs, the governing body is represented by the foundation
council. The decision-making process may then vary across institutional forms.
Worthington and Dollery (2000) speak of local government managers being con-
strained by a host of non-discretionary factors in arriving at e¢ cient outcomes
(p.14). Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) see public managers as being constrained
by some government agreement to implement any cost innovation decision while
managers of private-law rms can freely implement these decisions. In addition,
private-law rms are expected to face lower probability to be bailed out by public
authorities or tougher punishment for poor managerial e¤ort. Di¤erences in the
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institutional form may then lead to di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of NHs. However,
behavioral di¤erences between institutional forms may be mitigated in highly reg-
ulated systems such as the Swiss nursing home sector.
The issue of the most e¢ cient organizational form in the provision of nursing
care has not received a conclusive answer by the economic literature so far. The
literature has mainly focused on the e¤ect of the ownership by comparing for-prot
privately-owned and publicly-owned organizations (e.g. Chou, 2002; Crivelli et al.,
2002; Santerre and Vernon, 2005; Grabowski et al., 2009). However, in the Swiss
nursing home sector the majority of NHs are not-for-prot organizations (both
public and private).
Within the nonprot sector, there is no accepted theory of organizational
behavior, although Kapur and Weisbrod (2000) have since long recognized that
governmental and private nonprot rms do di¤er in their objective functions.
From an empirical point of view, little work has been done on the impact of the
institutional form on productive e¢ ciency. To our knowledge, only few studies
(e.g. Vitaliano and Torren, 1994; Farsi and Filippini, 2004; Holmes, 1996; Farsi et
al., 2008) analyze the impact of the institutional form on the performance of not-
for-prot NHs. Two studies use Swiss data. Farsi and Filippini (2004) estimate a
random e¤ect model with time-invariant ine¢ ciency as proposed by Schmidt and
Sicklers (1984) using data on Swiss Italian NHs. The authors show that foun-
dations are slightly more e¢ cient than governmental NHs. The study has two
main drawbacks. First, given the length of the panel, the assumption of time-
invariant ine¢ ciency may not be appropriate. Second, since the individual e¤ects
are interpreted as ine¢ ciency, they are likely to include any unobserved factor
which remains constant over time. Therefore, in the presence of unobserved het-
erogeneity, the results can be biased. To tackle these aspects, Farsi et al. (2008)
estimate a true random e¤ect model (TRE) on a panel of Swiss NHs and do not
nd signicant di¤erences between institutional forms. The new approach allows
for time-varying ine¢ ciency and controls for the unobserved heterogeneity. How-
ever, another weakness arises if part of the ine¢ ciency remains constant over time.
In fact, an important drawback of this approach is that constant ine¢ ciency is
captured by the individual e¤ects rather than being included in the traditional
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ine¢ ciency term. This may lead to incorrect results if one is interested in explain-
ing part of the ine¢ ciency with a variable that does not change over time, such
as the institutional form.
In this paper, we hypothesize that there are two forms of ine¢ ciency: a per-
sistent, institutional form-related component, and a time-varying part related to
managerial skills. The institutional form cannot be controlled by the manager
but denes organizational di¤erences between NHs, which a¤ects the managerial
decision process. To capture di¤erences in the institutional form, we incorporate
a dummy variable directly into the deterministic part of the cost frontier and es-
timate a TRE model. This methodology allows us to purge the individual e¤ects
from the impact of the institutional form, which is then added to the traditional
time-varying ine¢ ciency estimator. Consequently, the novelty of our approach as
compared to previous comparative studies on hospital e¢ ciency (e.g. Grosskopf
and Valdmanis, 1987; Ozcan, Wogen and Mau, 1998) is that it combines the ap-
proach of including the dummy variable in the deterministic part of the frontier
with the TRE model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we sketch a
theoretical model of managerial behavior in NHs and derive hypotheses on the
impact of di¤erent institutional forms on cost e¢ ciency. In section 3 we present
the empirical analysis and the data. Section 4 discusses the methodology used
to validate the hypotheses derived in section 2. Section 5 summarizes the results
and suggests some policy implications of our analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Our theoretical approach draws from studies that model the bargaining process
between the management and the ownership (e.g. Schmitz, 2000) or the manage-
ment and workers (e.g. Glaeser, 2002).1 To capture the behavior of public-law
and private-law NHs, we sketch a model where low managerial e¤ort translate
into low e¢ ciency levels, as in Haskel and Sanchis (1995). The governing board
of the NH (G) may take two di¤erent institutional forms: public-law (i = Pu) or
1One alternative approach to investigate the e¤ect of the ownership on rms performance is
the principal-agent approach (e.g. Kessler and Lülfesmann, 2001; Pint, 1991).
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private-law (i = Pr). A Manager (M) runs the organization and a regulator (R)
denes the nancial resources for the NH. The total costs of the NH are described
by the following equation:
Ci =    ie. (1)
The rst term to the right hand side of equation (1), , is a structural parame-
ter dening costs that are independent from managerial e¤ort and only partially
observable by the regulator. This parameter depends, for instance, on the sever-
ity mix of patients, the number and quality of professional sta¤ members, or the
location of the NH. Costs include a xed remuneration for the manager (W ). For
simplicity, we assume that  is a random variable which takes only two values:
 and , with  >. The probability that  =  and  =  is q and (1   q)
respectively. The last term in the equation, e, is the managers e¤ort to reduce
total costs. The parameter i 2 (0; 1) reects the e¤ectiveness of managerial ef-
fort, i.e. the marginal impact of e¤ort on costs. This parameter varies with the
institutional form of the NH and represents a constraint on managersautonomy
in the decision-making process. The parameter i can also be interpreted as the
impact of bureaucratic decision-making processes.
In Switzerland, NHs are local monopolies and the demand for NH services is
assumed to be independent from actions undertaken by other homes. We normal-
ize to one the population of patients in each market area. Therefore, equation (1)
can also represent the average cost per patient.
Costs are observed at the end of the year by the regulator. However, the reg-
ulator cannot distinguish between structural costs and the impact of managerial
e¤ort. An ex-ante budget is applied to nance NHs based on the following rule:
B = q + (1  q) = b. (2)
The regulator knows the mean and the variance of the distribution of the struc-
tural cost parameter. However, the realization of  for a given NH is unknown.
Hence, the regulator can only set a budget based on the weighted average of the
structural parameters.
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2.1 Nursing homes objectives
The behavior of NHs is dened by the interaction between the board and the
manager. The utility function of the board is given by the following equation:
UGi = Si   i(B   Ci)2, (3)
where Si represents exogenous benets from the production of nursing home ser-
vices that may also vary with the institutional form.2 Disutility from an un-
balanced budget is a quadratic function which also varies with the institutional
form, with Pu < Pr, and i 2 (0; 1) captures the impact of deviations from
an unbalanced budget. Note that unbalanced budgets generate a disutility both
if nancial resources are greater than costs and vice versa. This is because the
fund-raising activity to match the lack of resources is costly. Also, an excess of
nancial resources is detrimental since these resources cannot be retained. Within
the Swiss Italian budgeting system, NHs are required to pay back the regulator
the remaining resources at the end of the year. This means that e¢ cient NHs are
not rewarded for their e¤ort in controlling costs. Consequently, NHs maximize
their objective function when the budget is balanced.3
We can now turn to the objectives of the manager. The managers utility can
be dened by the following expression:
UMi =W   (e) + iUGi ; (4)
where W is the managers wage, (e) is disutility of e¤ort, and i 2 (0; 1) is the
degree the goals of the board are internalized by the manager. Substituting for UGi
in (4), the marginal impact of an unbalanced budget on managers utility is ii.
We assume that managers utility is additive in e¤ort and the degree of sharing
of the boards objectives, with d=de > 0 and d2=de2 > 0. We also hypothesize
that the disutility of e¤ort takes the form (e) = 2e
2, with  > 0. The marginal
impact of e¤ort on managers utility is then captured by the parameter . Finally,
the level of e¤ort is bounded to take a value in the interval e 2 [0; emax]; where
2For example, a public-law board may value the preferences of the whole voterscommunity
while a private-law board may value those of the donors or of particular groups of interest.
3The nonprot literature is rich of models following this approach (e.g. Zweifel et al., 2009).
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emax =
q
i
(   ):4 For simplicity, the reservation utility is assumed to be zero so
that the participation constraint of the manager is always satised for any level
of the wage.
2.2 Managerial e¤ort
The optimal choice of e¤ort for the manager is obtained from the rst-order con-
ditions to maximize (4) under two possible scenarios: over nancing ( = ) and
under nancing
 
 = 

. Remember that the budget is dened by the regulator
as a weighted average of the structural cost parameter (2). Using (1) and (2),
we then observe that for  =  we have B   Ci > 0 for any level of e¤ort e.
Conversely, for  = , we have B   Ci  0 for any e 2 [0; emax]. To write the
rst-order conditions for the two scenarios, we rst substitute (1) and (2) into (3).
Using (3) we then replace UGi in (4), and nally derive (4) for the level of e¤ort
to get:
dU
de
j= =  e  2iii

ie+ (1  q)(   )
  0, (5)
dU
de
j= =  e  2iii

ie+ q(   )

= 0. (6)
Solving the two equations we get the equilibrium levels of e¤ort as:
e =
(
0 :  = 
iiq( )
+2i i
:  = 
, (7)
where i = ii. Note that for  = , the manager has no incentive to make a
positive e¤ort. This is because any positive level of e¤ort would increase economic
prots which cannot be retained by the rm. Conversely, for  = , a positive
level of e¤ort is valuable to reduce losses. The optimal level of e¤ort clearly
depends on the magnitude of the di¤erence between high structural costs () and
low structural costs ().
2.3 Model predictions
From eq. (7) above, note that managerial e¤ort varies according to the type of
productivity constraint of NHs dened by the institutional form (i = Pu; Pr).
4This ensures that the manager can decrease costs up to the level where B = C. Beyond this
level, more e¤ort would reduce the utility of the manager since a higher level of e¤ort produces
resources that cannot be exploited.
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Given the features of the funding system, there are no behavioral di¤erences
between the two institutional forms if NHs are generally over nanced, i.e. if
 = . In this case, the choice of e¤ort does not depend on the institutional
form-specic parameters. Therefore, we focus on the choice of e¤ort when  = ,
i.e. when NHs incur a loss or just cover costs. Managerial e¤ort depends on the
marginal disutility of a loss (i) and the importance of the boards objectives (i),
which is captured by the parameter i. Finally, managerial e¤ort depends on the
marginal impact of managers e¤ort on costs (i).
Looking at the comparative static properties of the equilibrium in the case of
undernancing, we can shortly discuss how the other parameters of interest a¤ect
the optimal choice of e¤ort. For  = , we get:5
de
di

> 0 : i <

2i
 0 : otherwise , (8)
The optimal level of e¤ort exerted by the manager increases for low levels
of i and decreases when i is relatively high. Since i represents the marginal
impact of e¤ort on costs, eq. (8) implies that a higher level of e¤ort is required
to cover costs when the marginal impact of e¤ort is relatively low, given the
marginal disutility of an unbalanced budget and the degree the goals of the board
are internalized (i) and the marginal cost of e¤ort for the manager ().
As for the impact of i, we have de
=di > 0:6 Since i = ii with both
i and i lower than 1, we also conclude that de
=di > 0 and de=di > 0:
Therefore, higher marginal disutility of unbalanced budgets for the board (i)
which is shared by the manager (i), leads to higher levels of managerial e¤ort
in equilibrium. Finally, from (8) we get de=d < 0 which implies that a higher
marginal cost of e¤ort for the manager decreases the equilibrium level of e¤ort to
reduce costs, as expected.
Previous studies suggest that parameters i and i di¤er across institutional
forms. We hypothesize that Pu<Pr and Pu < Pr . The rst parameter of
interest, i, is a key factor in our analysis. It seems plausible that governmental
5By deriving (7) for  =  with respect to i we get de

di
=
iq( )( i2i )
(+i
2
i )
2 : This is positive
if the last term at the numerator is positive, which leads to (8).
6Deriving (7) for  =  with respect to i, we obtain:
de
di
= iq( )
(+i
2
i )
2 which is always
satised.
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boards put more bureaucratic curbs on the management decisions than boards of
foundations. This leads to higher marginal costs of innovations to reduce costs
and, therefore, to less e¤ective managerial e¤ort (lower i). This argument has
already been recognized by other authors, for instance Worthington and Dollery
(2000).
The second parameter of interest, i, refers to the marginal impact of an un-
balanced budget on managers utility. This impact is expected to be higher in
the case of private-law NHs for two reasons. First, private-law NHs face higher
fund-raising costs as compared to public-law NHs (Kornai, 1980; Duggan, 2000).
This is because the local government is likely to cover costs of public-law NHs
that exceed the resources allocated by the regulator. Second, the degree to which
managers working in private-law NHs share the objectives of the council is ex-
pected to be higher, or at least equal, than that of managers working in public-law
NHs. This idea relies on factors suggested by di¤erent authors in the literature
(Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Lakdwalla and Philipson, 1998; Wilson, 1989). Managers
working in foundations are more likely to be driven by altruistic motives and to
be punished in case of poor performance, and are less likely to follow multiple
objectives with which the manager may not agree.
To summarize, our model predicts that the behavior of NHs varies with the
institutional form. In the case of under nancing, the utility-maximizing e¤ort of
managers in private-law NHs is likely to be higher than the e¤ort of managers in
public-law NHs, which leads to higher e¢ ciency in private-law NHs. To investigate
this hypothesis empirically, we specify a cost function for public-law and private-
law NHs operating in Switzerland and compare their cost e¢ ciency.
3 Empirical specication and data
3.1 Detailing the cost function
We assume that the NH transforms two inputs, capital and labor, into a single
output, measured by the number of patient-days of nursing care.7 As mentioned
in section 2, we can rule out strategic interactions among NHs and their e¤ect
on the demand of patients since Swiss NHs are local monopolies. The number of
7A similar approach is followed, for instance, by Farsi and Filippini (2004).
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patient-days can then be considered a good indicator of the level of production
after controlling for di¤erences in quality. The total costs function depends on
output (Y ), the prices for capital and labor (Pk and Pl), technological progress
captured by a time trend (), two output characteristics (Q1 and Q2) and a
dummy variable which takes value equal to 1 for public-law NHs, and 0 otherwise
(Z):8 ;9
C = f(Y; Pk; Pl;  ;Q1; Q2; Z). (9)
Our dummy variable captures di¤erences in the parameters i and i across in-
stitutional forms, as hypothesized in section 2.
The price of labor is calculated as the weighted average wage of di¤erent
professional categories employed in the NH (doctors, nurses, administrative and
technical sta¤), while the price of capital is derived from the residual approach:
labor costs are subtracted from total costs and the residual is divided by the
capital stock approximated by the number of beds.
Additionally, we control for some output characteristics that may explain cost
di¤erences across NHs.10 Q1 is an index which measures average patients assis-
tance by means of normal daily activities such as eating, personal care or physio-
logical activities. This is calculated on a yearly basis by the Regional Department
of Public Health (RDPH). Patients are classied in one out of ve categories ac-
cording to their severity level. A value between 0 and 4 is assigned where higher
values indicate more severe cases. Q2 is the nursing sta¤ ratio, that is the ratio
between the number of nurses employed and the number of nurses that should
be employed according to the guidelines of the RDPH. Because nursing care is a
labor-intensive service, the ratio can be considered as an indicator for quality.11
8 In addition to the specied cost function, we considered an alternative specication which
includes a third input factor called material. However, we dropped this option due to di¢ culties
in dening an appropriate measure for this input quantity.
9 In a non-competitive environment such as the Swiss one, there is no reason to assume that
NHs minimize costs. In this case, the estimated costs function is a behavioral cost function
(Evans, 1971) and can still be used to make a comparison among rms. Moreover, by estimating
a total costs function instead of a variable costs function we avoid the risk related to a possible
high correlation between capital stock and output leading to a positive relationship between
variable cost and capital stock (Filippini, 1996).
10 In order to estimate a cost function, either the output is assumed to be homogenous or we
need to control for service intensity and patientscharacteristics (Birnbaum et al., 1981).
11The cost of labor represents about 85% of total costs. Consequently, a small change in
10
In order to impose as few restrictions as possible, we adopt a exible translog
functional form approximated at the median value, a less sensible statistic to
outliers than the mean. Input prices and total costs are then divided by the
capital price in order to satisfy the homogeneity condition in input prices.12 The
translog approximation to (9) is:
ln

C
Pk

= 0 + Y lnY + Q1 lnQ1 + Q2 lnQ2 + Pl ln
Pl
Pk
+12Y Y (lnY )
2 + 12Q1Q1(lnQ1)
2 + 12Q2Q2(lnQ2)
2
+12PlPl

ln PlPk
2
+ Y Q1 lnY lnQ1 + Y Q2 lnY lnQ2
+Y Pl lnY ln
Pl
Pk
+ Q1Pl lnQ1 ln
Pl
Pk
+ Q1Q2 lnQ1 lnQ2
+P1Q2 ln
Pl
Pk
lnQ2 + t + zZ + "it
(10)
Finally, the concavity condition in input prices is checked after the estimation
of the parameters.
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Our study exploits a panel data set of 44 NHs operating in Canton Ticino, Switzer-
land, over a 7-years period (1999-2005).13 Since the sample includes all skilled
NHs in cantonal nursing home planning, their production process is highly ho-
mogenous.
Data are extracted from annual reports delivered to the RDPH by regulated
NHs. NHs with foyers are excluded from our sample.14 Three NHs show unrea-
the nursing sta¤ ratio may a¤ect total cost considerably. For this reason, NHs with high costs
may decide to decrease the proportion of workers. On the other hand, e¢ cient NHs may hire
new workers or increase the working time in order to justify additional costs to the regulatory
authority. This endogeneity issue is checked using the robust Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Cameron
and Trivedi, 2005). We perform this test using the lagged of Q2 as instrumental variable. The
test statistic is chi-squared distributed with a robust score 2(1) = 0:49 or F (1; 234) = 0:395.
The null hypothesis of exogenous Q2 cannot be rejected at any standard levels of signicance.
12The cost function is linear homogenous of degree 1 in input prices when a 10% increase in
all input prices leads to a 10% increase in total cost.
13Data are available until year 2010. However, in 2006 a new nancing system was introduced.
This change may have a¤ected the relative e¢ ciency of di¤erent institutions. Consequently, we
excluded the period 2006-2010 from the present analysis. The impact of the new reform on the
performance of NHs will be analyzed in a separate paper.
14Foyers are external residential apartments where nursing care is provided to the most in-
health patients. Since the production process may di¤er substantially, when a considerable
share of patient-days is spent in foyers (> 10%), these observations are dropped.
11
Variables Mean S.D. Median Min. Max.
Average cost (Sfr/resident day) 227.77 27.66 225.02 160.92 309.23
Total annual resident days (Y ) 23227 9398.50 21656 9925 58324
Average dependency index (Q1) 3.05 0.36 3.08 0.80 3.80
Nursing sta¤ ratio (Q2) 0.96 0.09 0.95 0.74 1.55
Average labor price in Sfr per 78855 5274 79282 63604 93237
employee per year (Pl)
Average capital price in Sfr 13103 3263 12636 6370 33171
per bed (Pk)
Number of beds 66 26.4 62 28 162
Notes: All monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs (Sfr), adjusted by the national Consumer Price
Index.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the main costs and input variables (287 obser-
vations).
sonable values, hence they are also excluded from the analysis. The nal sample
contains 287 observations of 24 private-law NHs and 20 public-law NHs.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the main costs and input variables
of interest: mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum values
for our sample. All input prices, total cost and variable cost are inated to 2005
constant currency units (Swiss francs) using the national Consumer Price Index.
Variables Private-law NHs Public-law NHs t-value
(Pr) (Pu)
Average cost (Sfr/resident day) 233.685 221.389 3.852
(29.964) (23.422)
Total annual resident days (Y ) 20103.05 26599.89 -6.225
(7046.662) (10425.21)
Average dependency index (Q1) 3.079 3.014 1.506
(0.366) (0.359)
Nursing sta¤ ratio (Q2) 0.992 0.981 0.774
(0.154) (0.078)
Average labor price in Sfr per 79014.65 78682.59 0.532
employee per year (Pl) (5092.768) (5476.3)
Average capital price in Sfr 14353.95 11752.38 7.346
per bed (Pk) (3790.485) (1780.969)
Number of beds 58.087 75.427 -5.873
(20.556) (29.031)
Number of homes 24 20 -
Number of observations 149 138 -
Notes: Standard deviations are given in brackets. All monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs (Sfr),
adjusted by the national Consumer Price Index. Signicance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
Table 2: Di¤erences in mean costs and inputs among institutional forms.
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The average cost per resident day in the most expensive NH is twice the av-
erage cost of the less expensive home, with an average of about 228 Swiss francs.
This di¤erence is at least partially explained by the large heterogeneity in NHs
characteristics. In particular, facilities vary in size. The number of beds ranges
from a minimum of 28 to a maximum of 162, which leads to a high standard devi-
ation also in the total annual resident days. Di¤erences in output characteristics
are also remarkable. The average patient dependency index ranges from 0:8 to
3:8, while the nursing sta¤ ratio varies between 0:74 and 1:55. If NHs followed
the guidelines of the RDPH and emploied as many nurses as it is suggested, the
nursing sta¤ ratio would be 1. Finally, we consider the input prices. The largest
variation is observed for the price of capital. The highest price for a bed is ve
times higher than the lowest price. This remarkable heterogeneity may be ex-
plained by the investments made during the 90s in order to increase the number
of beds available. Due to the length of our panel, part of the increase in the
number of beds may also derive from a technological change.
To focus on di¤erences between public-law and private-law NHs, we calculate
the mean and the standard deviation of some characteristics separately for each
subsample (Table 2). In the last column of Table 2, we report the results of a
two-sided t-test under the null hypothesis of equal means between the two groups.
The statistics show that, on average, private-law NHs spend more money per
patient day than public-law homes do, and the di¤erence is highly statistically
signicant. However, public-law homes have access to cheaper capital and are
generally bigger. While the average number of beds in foundations is around 58,
the average number of beds in public-law NHs is 30% higher, which suggests that
public-law homes may enjoy decreasing average costs, as suggested in previous
studies (Farsi et al., 2008; Hoess et al., 2009). Regarding output characteristics,
the two groups do not show signicant di¤erences. The mean dependency index
and the nursing sta¤ ratio are very close. Similarly, the average labor price per
employee does not di¤er.
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4 Methodology
We investigate the e¤ect of institutional form on the performance of NHs by
applying two di¤erent econometric approaches. Both methods estimate a bench-
marking cost frontier against which the actual performance of the rms in the
sample is compared.15 The main di¤erence between the two approaches lies in
the way exogenous factors are treated in the analysis of e¢ ciency.16
The rst approach (Model 1) relies on the assumption that the institutional
form a¤ects the degree of ine¢ ciency directly. The performance of each NH is
measured in relation to a single best practice frontier and the impact of the insti-
tutional form on ine¢ ciency is tested afterwards by means of the non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis test.
The second approach (Model 2) derives from the literature on environmental
characteristics, where it has been recently applied to di¤erent industries. This
approach includes a dummy for the institutional form directly into the main cost
equation and estimates two distinct best practice frontiers. The rationale is that
NHs with di¤erent institutional forms may face di¤erent operating environments
and/or objectives. Consequently, they can adopt di¤erent combinations of inputs.
The resulting ine¢ ciencies are net of institutional characteristics (net ine¢ cien-
cies) and can be interpreted primarily as an indicator of managerial performance
(Coelli et al., 1999). The distance between the actual costs and the group-specic
best practice frontier provides information about the within-group ine¢ ciency of
foundations and public NHs. Conversely, the between-groups ine¢ ciency is mea-
sured as the distance between the two frontiers, i.e. the coe¢ cient of the dummy
variable.17 Finally, by re-evaluating the traditional e¢ ciency predictor with the
formula applied by Coelli et al. (1999), all rms can be compared to the most
15We also estimate a cost function by means of regression models: OLS, random e¤ect (RE)
and xed e¤ect (FE) where the institutional form is captured by a dummy variable. The results
are presented in the Appendix and support ndings from stochastic frontier models.
16See Simar, Lovell, and Vanden Eeckaut (1994) for a review of approaches to include exogenous
factors in e¢ ciency measurement studies.
17The approach has been applied in the literature on hospital e¢ ciency in order to study the
impact of ownership (Grosskopf and Valdmanis, 1987) and size (Ozcan, Wogen, and Mau, 1998).
In both cases the authors nd evidence of di¤erent best practice frontiers for di¤erent groups of
hospitals.
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favorable best practice frontier. This is achieved by multiplying the usual time-
varying e¢ ciency predictor (uit) with the exponential of the estimated coe¢ cient
related to the institutional form dummy, here called (Pu). Cost e¢ ciency (CE)
for NH i at time t is formally dened as:
CEit = E [exp (uit + Z) j"it] = E [exp (uit) j"it] exp (Z) . (11)
Eq. (11) allows to obtain a measure of gross ine¢ ciencies. In particular, the
(in)e¢ ciency level of public-law NHs is derived under the assumption that these
rms face the same operative environment and/or objectives than private-law
NHs.
For both the approaches described above, we estimate a pooled frontier and a
true random e¤ects model (TRE) developed by Greene (2005). In both specica-
tions, the random error term ("it) is composed by a symmetric term (vit) capturing
statistical noise and a one-sided non-negative disturbance representing the ine¢ -
ciency (uit). The pooled frontier estimator is based on the original cost frontier
model proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and considers the sample as series of
cross-sectional observations. The rm-specic e¤ects (i) are assumed to be zero.
The TRE model is an extension to the Pooled frontier model in that it includes
an additional rm-specic e¤ect (i) to represent the unobserved heterogeneity
among rms. This e¤ect is considered as a random e¤ect.
Pooled model TRE
Half  Normal Half  Normal
Firm-specic e¤ect i None N (0, 2)
Random error "it
"it = uit + vit
uit  N+(0; 2u)
vit  N(0; 2v)
"it = uit + vit
uit  N+(0; 2u)
vit  N(0; 2v)
Table 3: Econometric specication of the Pooled frontier and TRE models.
The adoption of the TRE model can be regarded as an improvement compared
to the pooled frontier since the inclusion of rm-specic e¤ects allows to control
for the unobserved heterogeneity. However, if part of the ine¢ ciency is constant
over time, its impact is captured by the individual e¤ects and, consequently, it
is interpreted as heterogeneity rather than ine¢ ciency. It follows that the overall
ine¢ ciency is underestimated and the term which is interpreted as ine¢ ciency
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cannot capture the e¤ect of the institutional form. This limitation is overcome
by our second approach where gross ine¢ ciencies include the impact of constant
ine¢ ciency due to the institutional form. Indeed, disentangling time-invariant
ine¢ ciency from latent heterogeneity is of major interest and may represent a
valid improvement if compared to previous analysis of e¢ ciency in NHs. Table
(3) summarizes the econometric specication of the frontier models used in this
study:
5 Results
We now discuss the results from the two approaches - with and without the
institutional form dummy variable - estimated with a pooled frontier and a TRE
model. In Table 4, we report the estimated coe¢ cients together with their level
of signicance and, for Model 2 only, the impact of the dummy variable for the
institutional form. Standard errors are given in brackets. All the coe¢ cients
are highly signicant and positive. The interaction terms are not displayed but
some of them are also statistically signicant. The estimated coe¢ cients are quite
robust across di¤erent specications. The only exception is the coe¢ cient related
to patients severity (Q1). This coe¢ cient is lower when the individual e¤ects are
considered, which provides some evidence of unobserved heterogeneity. However,
this heterogeneity is at least partially taken into account in the TRE estimation.
In fact, the estimated coe¢ cient of the variable Q1 in the TRE estimation is lower
than the coe¢ cient in the pooled frontier and approaches the estimated coe¢ cient
of the xed e¤ect model.18
The output coe¢ cient (Y ) is smaller than 1, which suggests the presence of
economies of scale. The coe¢ cients of the two output characteristics (Q1 , Q2)
show that more severe patients lead to higher costs. Similarly, more nurses per
patient cause higher production costs. The estimated share of labor costs given by
the coe¢ cient of input prices (Pl) is about 80%. The actual share of labor costs
18 In order to test the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate a xed e¤ect mode.
This has the advantage of not su¤ering from heterogeneity bias. Estimated coe¢ cients are very
close in magnitude to the results of the pooled and the TRE models. Only the coe¢ cient related
to patient case-mix di¤ers substantially and is around 0.17. The true xed e¤ect model cannot
be applied because it does not converge.
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Estimated Stochastic frontier models Stochastic frontier models with
coe¢ cients (Model 1) dummy variable (Model 2)
Pooled frontier TRE Pooled frontier TRE

Y
0.927 0.905 0.913 0.898
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)

Q1
0.430 0.233 0.444 0.291
(0.009) (0.024) (0.029) (0.025)

Q2
0.459 0.391 0.473 0.414
(0.029) (0.023) (0.037) (0.019)

Pl
0.820 0.791 0.800 0.775
(0.038) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011)

Z
- 0.027 0.033
- (0.007) (0.005)
 =


1.040 2.062 1.386 1.813
(0.156) (0.347) (0.183) (0.298)
Notes: Signicance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
Table 4: Estimated rst-order coe¢ cients (287 observations) of pooled stochastic
frontier models and TRE models.
is about 85%. Finally, the dummy variable for the institutional form in Model 2
is positive and highly signicant. This indicates that, at the approximation point,
public-law NHs are more costly than private-law NHs by about 3% on average.19
In the last row of Table 4, we provide the statistics for lambda (), the ratio
between the standard deviation of the ine¢ ciencies and the standard deviation of
the stochastic term. Since the value of lambda denes the relative contribution
of the ine¢ ciency term with respect to the stochastic term, a positive and statis-
tically signicant number supports the existence of the two error components.20
The di¤erence in the lambda coe¢ cient between the two models arises because
of the di¤erent model specication. The concavity condition is not satised since
the Hessian Matrix, @
2 lnCit
@wj@wi
, is not negative semi-denite.21
19This result is consistent with the regression approach presented in the Appendix. Also, it
conrms ndings by Farsi and Filippini (2004), which can be explained with a relatively low
(impact of) unobserved heterogeneity in the NH industry on the estimated ine¢ ciency levels.
20 In addition, we performed an analysis of the skeweness of the OLS residuals. As Waldman
(1982) shows, when the OLS residuals are skewed in the wrong direction, the results from
the maximum likelihood estimator are those of a simple OLS rather than a cost frontier. The
normality test shows that the OLS residuals are right skewed (0:216) and the null hypothesis
of normally distributed residuals can be rejected at 99% signicance level. Therefore, data and
model specication support the adoption of stochastic frontier models.
21Our results indicate that the Hessian matrix of the estimated cost functions as with respect
to input prices (labor and capital) calculated at the approximation point is not negative semi-
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It is worth pointing out at the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test on the null
hypothesis of equal ine¢ ciency mean between the two institutional forms (Table
5). P -values are reported in brackets. In the rst two columns of Table 5 we report
Kruskal-Wallis Ine¢ ciencies Gross ine¢ ciencies Net ine¢ ciencies
test on H0: Model 1 Model 2 Model 2
Pooled TRE Pooled TRE Pooled TRE
Pu=Pr NO NO NO NO YES YES
(p-value) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) (0.559)
Table 5: Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test on the equality of mean ine¢ ciency
between public-law and private-law NHs.
the results of the test for Model 1; where we do not control for the institutional
form in the main cost equation. The test rejects the null hypothesis at the 5%
level of signicance in both model specications (pooled and TRE). However, the
results of the pooled frontier model may su¤er from heterogeneity bias, while the
higher p-value in the TRE model may be explained by the fact that part of the
ine¢ ciency is captured by the individual e¤ects.
The remaining columns of Table 5 report the results of the Kruskal-Wallis
test for Model 2, respectively for the gross ine¢ ciencies and the ine¢ ciencies
net of the institutional form e¤ect. As for gross ine¢ ciencies, the test conrms
that public-law and private-law NHs di¤er. The p-value in the TRE model is
smaller compared to Model 1, likely because this approach disentangles constant
ine¢ ciency due to the institutional form from latent heterogeneity. If this holds
true, the null hypothesis in the Kruskal-Wallis test in previous studies applying
the TRE model may have been under-rejected (e.g. Farsi et al., 2008). Finally,
by comparing net ine¢ ciencies, it is possible to shed further light on di¤erences
between private-law and public-law NHs. The Kruskal-wallis test suggests that
managerial skills do not di¤er signicantly across institutional forms. It might be
that highly skilled managers are equally present in NHs with di¤erent institutional
forms.
denite. Thus, the concavity condition is not satised in any of the specications, meaning that
rmsstrategies are not responsive to changes in input factor prices. This can be explained by
the fact that input choices in Swiss NHs are substantially limited by the regulation (Filippini and
Farsi, 2004). The interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients in Table 3 relies on the behavioral
cost framework proposed by Bös (1986).
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The above results can be illustrated by comparing the distribution of the
estimated ine¢ ciency scores for Model 1 and Model 2. Figure ?? shows how con-
stant ine¢ ciency due to di¤erences in the institutional form may not be captured
by the estimated ine¢ ciency scores of models with individual e¤ects (Model 1).
The rst graph on the left hand side shows the distribution of ine¢ ciencies esti-
mated according to Model 1 for public-law NHs and private-law NHs. The mean
ine¢ ciency level of public-law NHs is slightly higher as compared to the mean
ine¢ ciency level of private-law NHs. This di¤erence disappears once we purge
the mean ine¢ ciencies from di¤erences in the institutional form (Model 2), as
shown in the graph in the middle. Finally, di¤erences are more signicant when
we include the impact of constant ine¢ ciency due to the institutional form into
traditional predicted ine¢ ciencies (last graph to the right).
6 Conclusions
Do NHs with di¤erent institutional forms but subject to the same regulatory
incentives perform equally? To tackle this question we developed a model of
cost e¢ ciency in NHs where rms are local monopolists nanced by the regional
government through an ex-ante budget. Cost e¢ ciency depends on the institu-
tional form because of di¤erent legal constraints faced by the management in the
decision-making process and the degree to which the management internalizes the
objectives of the board. Our model hypothesizes that private-law institutions,
both public and private, can be more e¢ cient than public-law NHs, despite the
tight regulation limiting and controlling the behavior of NHs. Using data from
Swiss-Italian NHs, we provide empirical evidence that private-law NHs are on av-
erage less costly (about 3%) than public-law NHs, ceteris paribus. This result is
consistent across di¤erent econometric approaches and model specications.
The presence of latent heterogeneity related to patients severity of illness sug-
gests that the TRE model may avoid biased estimates. However, this model su¤ers
from the limitation of interpreting persistent ine¢ ciency as latent heterogeneity.
In order to address this issue, we include a dummy variable for the institutional
form in the deterministic part of the frontier. The skewed term can be interpreted
primarily as an indicator of managerial skills. From a policy point of view, our
19
ndings appear to suggest that the provision of nursing care services by publicly-
owned organizations run as private-law rms, may be a preferable solution as
compared to governmental NHs.
The main shortcoming of the present study is that it does not allow to say
whether the e¢ ciency gap results from the reduced probability of bailing out
private-law NHs or their higher managerial exibility. Therefore, e¢ ciency dif-
ferences are assumed to be the outcome of both factors. Finally, our quality
indicator, the nursing sta¤ ratio, may capture only partially di¤erences in quality
aspects such as sta¤ experience, organizational skills or patients satisfaction. Fur-
ther research is necessary to disentangle the impact of quality di¤erences across
institutional forms.
References
Aigner, D., Lovell, C. A. K. and Schmidt, P. (1977). Formulation and estimation of
stochastic frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics, 6, 2137.
Birnbaum, H., Bishop, C., Lee, A. and Jensen, G. (1981). Why Do Nursing Home Costs
Vary? The Determinants of Nursing Home Costs. Medical Care, 19(11), 1095-1107.
Bös, D. (1986). Public Enterprise Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Cameron, A. C. and Trivedi, P. K. (2005). Microeconometrics. Methods and Applications.
Cambridge University Press, New York.
Chou, S. (2002). Asymmetric information, ownership and quality of care: an empirical
anaysis of nursing homes. Journal of Health Economics, 21, 293-311.
Coelli, T., Perelman, S. and Romano, E. (1999). Accounting for Environmental Inuences
in Stochastic Frontier Models: With Application to International Airlines. Journal of
Productivity Analysis, 11, 251-273.
Crivelli, L., Filippini, M. and Lunati, D. (2002). Regulation, Ownership and E¢ ciency
in the Swiss Nursing Home Industry. International Journal of Health Care Finance and
Economics, 2(2), 79-97.
Duggan, M. G. (2000). Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115 (4), 1343-1373.
Evans, R.G. (1971). "Behavioural" Cost Functions for Hospitals, The Canadian Journal
of Economics, 4(2), 198-215.
20
Farsi, M. and Filippini, M. (2004). An empirical analysis of cost e¢ ciency in non-prot
and public nursing homes. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 75(3), 339-365.
Farsi, M., Filippini, M. and Lunati, D. (2008). Economies of Scale and E¢ ciency Mea-
surement in Switzerlands Nursing Homes. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics,
144(3), 359-378.
Filippini, M., 1996, Economies of Scale and Utilization in the Swiss Electric Power Dis-
tribution Industry, Applied Economics, 28, 543-550.^
Glaeser, E.L. (2002). The Governance of Not-For-Prot Firms, NBER Working Papers
8921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Grabowski, DC; Huskamp, HA; Stevenson, DG and Keating, NL. (2009). Ownership
status and home health care performance. Journal Aging Soc Policy, 21(2), 130-143.
Greene, W. (2005). Reconsidering heterogeneity in panel data estimators of stochastic
frontier model. Journal of Econometrics, 126, 269-303.
Grosskopf, S. and Valdmanis, V. (1987). Measuring hospital performance . A Non-
parametric Approach. Journal of Health Economics, 6, 89-107.
Hart, O., Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997). The Proper Scope of Government:
Theory and an Application to Prisons. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1127-1160.
Haskel, J. and Sanchis, A. (1995). Privatization and X-Ine¢ ciency: A Bargaining Ap-
proach. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 43 (3), 301-321.
Holmes, J. S. (1996). The e¤ects of ownership and ownership change on nursing home
industry costs. Health Services Research, 31(3), 327-46.
Hoess V, Bachler A, Ostermann H and Staudinger R. Cost control in nursing homes by
means of economies of scale and care prole optimization. Nurs Econ, 27(1), 45-50.
Kapur, K. And Weisbrod, B. A. (2000). The roles of government and nonprot suppliers
in mixed industries. Public Finance Review, 28 (7), 275-308.
Kessler, A.S. and Lülfesmann, C. (2001). Monitoring and Productive E¢ ciency in Public
and Private Firms.FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 58(2), 167-.
Kornai, J. (1980). Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Ozcan, Y.A., Wogen, S.E. and Mau L.W. (1998). E¢ ciency Evaluation of Skilled Nursing
Facilities. Journal of Medical Systems, 22(4), 211-224.
Pint, Ellen M. (1991), Nationalization vs. Regulation of Monopolies: The E¤ects of
Ownership on E¢ ciency, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 131-164.
21
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1996). Altruism, Nonprots, and Economic Theory. Journal of
Economic Literature, 34, 701-728.
Santerre, R.E. and Vernon, J.A. (2007). Ownership Form and Consumer Welfare: Evi-
dence from the Nursing Home Industry. Inquiry, 44, 381-399.
Schmidt, P. and Sickles, R.C. (1984). Production Frontiers and Panel Data. Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, 2(4), 367-374.
Schmitz, P.W. (2000). Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope
of Government Reconsidered. MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Ger-
many.
Simar, L., C.A. Knox Lovell and Ph. Vanden Eeckaut. (1994). Stochastic frontiers
incorporating exogenous inuences on e¢ ciency. UCL and CORE Discussion paper, 9403,
Institut de Statistique, UCL.
Vitaliano, D. F. and Toren, M. (1994). Cost and e¢ ciency in nursing homes: a stochastic
frontier approach. Journal of Health Economics, 13, 281-300.
Waldman, D.M. (1982). A Stationary Point for the Stochastic Frontier Likelihood. Jour-
nal of Econometrics, 18, 275-279. In Green, W. H. (Ed.), LIMDEP-Version 9.0. Econo-
metric Modeling Guide, Volume 2, New York, E33-14.
Wilson, J. (1989). Bureaucracy. Washington DC: Basic Books.
Worthington, A. and Dollery, B. (2000). E¢ ciency Measurement in the Local Public
Sector: Econometrics and Mathematical Programming Frontier Techniques. School of
Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series, 078, Queensland.
Zweifel, P., Breyer, F. and Ki¤man M. (2009). Health Economics. 2nd Ed., Springer-
Verlag, Berlin Heildelberg.
22
Appendix
Estimated
coe¢ cients
OLS Std.Err. RE Std.Err. FE Std.Err.
Y 0.914 0.010 0.903 0.014 0.845 0.029
Q1 0.433
 0.030 0.315 0.040 0.172 0.056
Q2 0.469
 0.038 0.433 0.034 0.413 0.037
Pl 0.801
 0.016 0.777 0.017 0.767 0.019
T 0.012 0.002 0.013 0.001 0.015 0.002
Y Y -0.050 0.040 -0.113 0.054 -0.372 0.112
Q1Q1 0.658
 0.111 0.577 0.118 0.315 0.147
Q2Q2 -0.283 0.198 -0.193 0.177 -0.167 0.188
PlPl 0.130 0.100 0.130 0.089 0.103 0.095
Y Q1 -0.018 0.081 -0.128 0.091 -0.104 0.114
Y Q2 0.532
 0.089 0.588 0.087 0.597 0.105
Y Pl 0.003 0.039 0.025 0.040 0.047 0.044
Q1Pl 0.252 0.158 0.208 0.146 0.037 0.159
Q1Q2 -1.296
 0.234 -0.845 0.223 -0.616 0.244
PlQ2 -0.375
 0.170 -0.429 0.145 -0.435 0.157

Z
0.024*** 0.007 0.030 0.011 - -
0 15.346 0.009 15.341 0.010 - -
R2 0.988 0.987 0.992
Notes: Signicance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
Table 6: Results of the non-frontier models OLS, RE and FE (287 observations).
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